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On the Economic Rationality of Market
Participants: The Case of Expectations
in the U.S.  Pork Market
Jean-Paul Chavas
This study investigates the nature of price expectations in a competitive market. The
approach  is illustrated  in an application  to the U.S. pork market,  which exhibits
cyclical patterns and biological production lags. Pork price equations are estimated
under different  expectation regimes.  The empirical results suggest the presence of
heterogeneous price expectations among market participants. A large proportion of
the  market (73%)  is found  to be  associated  with backward-looking  expectations,
where future prices are anticipated on the basis of their observed historical patterns.
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Introduction
An uncertain  and  changing  economic  environment  is  a pervasive  characteristic  of
dynamic resource  allocation. This means that economic agents constantly learn about
their environment  and adjust to its changes.  Studying this learning process and its
impact on  dynamic  resource  allocation  has been the subject  of much  research.  The
nature of expectation  formation has been the focus  of several  studies  (e.g.,  Ezekiel;
Nerlove;  Muth;  Nerlove,  Grether,  and  Carvalho;  Goodwin  and  Sheffrin;  Eckstein;
Orazem and Miranowski; Chow; Holt and Johnson; Nerlove and Fornari), and includes
at least four types of expectations:  naive, adaptive,  quasi-rational, and rational. Naive
expectations  involve future expected values being set equal to the latest observation
of the  corresponding  variable  (Ezekiel).  Expectations  are  adaptive  when  they  are
revised over time proportionally to the latest prediction error (Nerlove). Quasi-rational
expectations  are characterized  by predicted  values  from  a  time-series  model of the
corresponding  variable  (Nerlove,  Grether,  and  Carvalho).  Finally,  as  introduced  by
Muth, rational expectations are consistent with anticipated supply/demand conditions
in the market.
The rational  expectations  hypothesis  has occupied  a  central place.  It  states that
decision  makers make  "efficient use" of information, just as they  do  of other  scarce
resources. The issue then is to evaluate the exact meaning of "efficient use" of informa-
tion. If obtaining and processing information is costly, then optimal learning is expected
to depend on the net benefits of learning. When some new information is costly or diffi-
cult to process, it may not be used by decision makers (e.g., Conlisk). In such situations,
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simple rules of thumb for expectations formation (e.g., naive expectations) could be used.
Also, the ability to obtain and process information may vary across individuals.  Differ-
ences in education or experience could imply different learning rates across individuals,
ceteris  paribus.  Because  costs  and  benefits  of information  are  individual  specific,
different individuals may have different expectations.  At the aggregate level, dynamic
resource allocation then would be influenced by the heterogeneity of  expectations among
decision  makers.
The objective of this study is to investigate the nature of expectation formation, with
an empirical application to the U.S. pork market. An extensive body of literature has
analyzed the functioning of the pork market (e.g., Coase and Fowler; Breimyer; Larson;
Jelavich; Harlow; Talpaz; Kaylen; Shonkwiler and Spreen; Hayes and Schmitz; Chavas
and Holt). Much of the research has focused on describing and explaining the pork cycle.
In some respects, the presence of the pork cycle  can be disturbing for economists.  If a
predictable cycle existed, then producers responding in a counter-cyclical  fashion could
earn larger  than normal profits  over  time (Hayes  and  Schmitz).  In the  presence  of
predictable price movements, counter-cyclical production response could possibly smooth
out market fluctuations, causing the cycle to disappear.
Recent research has shown that rational expectations and efficient decisions do not
necessarily  imply the absence  of economic  cycles.  In partic  laular,  Rosen,  and Rosen,
Murphy, and Scheinkman have argued that an economic cycle can be fully consistent
with the efficient management of an animal population under rational expectations. Yet,
the assumption  of naive or adaptive expectations (dating back to Coase and Fowler;
Ezekiel; and others) has been a basic premise in much of the literature  on livestock
supply response (e.g., Foster and Burt). Because the dynamics of price expectations  by
market participants can influence price and market dynamics, the nature of rationality
could play a role in explaining the continued existence of economic cycles (e.g.,  Evans
and Ramey; Sargent; Leijonhufvud;  Conlisk; Brock and Hommes). This suggests a need
to investigate the exact nature of market information used in forming expectations and
in making production decisions.
This  analysis  develops  and  estimates  an econometric  model  of the pork  market.
Because  of production  lags in the pork production process, production  decisions  are
made  ahead  of marketing  decisions.  As  a result,  production  decisions  are based  on
expectations about future market conditions. We investigate the nature of expectations
within the pork industry, including naive, quasi-rational,  and rational expectations.
Under Muth's hypothesis, rational expectations would be forward-looking and based
on a full understanding of market pricing. This involves the demand side as well as the
supply side of the market. The supply side is dynamic as it involves the management
of the hog breeding herd over time. We derive supply dynamics from the economics  of
animal population management (e.g., Chavas and Klemme; Rosen; Rosen, Murphy, and
Scheinkman),  and  allow for heterogeneous  expectations  among  producers in supply
dynamics.  We  propose an  econometric  methodology  leading  to the specification  and
estimation  of a model  of price  determination  and dynamic market  allocation.  When
applied to the U.S. pork market, the methodology provides evidence of heterogeneous
expectations among pork producers. We find that a large proportion of the market (73%)
is associated with backward-looking expectations, where future prices are anticipated
on the basis of their observed historical patterns.
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Animal Population Management
Consider a competitive  firm managing an animal population. Let b, denote the size of
the breeding herd, as measured by the number of adults at time t. Given a reproduction
rate kt, the number of offspring at time t is denoted by h t = ktbt, where kt is the number
of offspring per adult. Assume that the length of a period is defined such that offspring
become adults after one period.  At time period t, each  offspring can face one of three
situations:  (a) it  can  be slaughtered for human  consumption,  (b)  it  can be  kept for
breeding,  or (c)  it  can  die of natural causes.  Let  h 8t denote the number  of offspring
slaughtered for human consumption, hbt the number of offspring kept for breeding, and
hdt the number of offspring dying of natural causes. This implies that:
(1)  ht = ktbt  = hst  +  hdt,
= h t + hbt  +  htht,
where hdt = 6htht, with 6ht denoting the death rate of offspring at time t. The evolution
of the breeding herd over time is then given by:
(2a)  bt+  - b  = hbt  - bst - bdt,
=  hbt  - bst - 8btbt
(2b)  =  (1  - 8ht)ktbt - btb t - st,
using equation (1),
where  bst is the number of adults slaughtered,  bdt = 6btbt is the number of adults dying
of natural causes, 6bt is the death rate among adults, and s, = (h8t + bst) denotes the total
number of animals slaughtered at time t. Equation (2a) simply states that the change
in the size of the breeding herd from one time period to the next equals the number of
offspring  added to the breeding herd, minus the number of adults slaughtered, minus
the number of adults dying of natural causes.
The management of the animal population is costly. Denote the cost of managing the
adult population bt, the offspring ht, and the slaughter st by ct(qt, bt, ht, st), where qt
represents input prices at time t. Assume that the animals slaughtered at time t (st) are
sold on a competitive market at a unit price Pt. Then, the firm's net income generated
from the management of the animal population at time t is:
(3)  -t  = PtSt - ct(qt, bt, ht,  st).
The firm faces uncertainty about future values of the market price Pt, the death rates
aht and 6bt  and the productivity factor kt. These variables are  observed at time t, but
their future values are treated as random. They are assumed to have some subjective
probability distribution reflecting the information available to the decision maker. The
evaluation of this uncertainty is discussed in more detail below.
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Assume that the manager of the animal population is risk neutral and makes deci-
sions so as to maximize the expected present value of net income over his/her planning
horizon.1 This corresponds to the following optimization problem:
Max  E  j  (1  +  r)-t'ct  s.t. equations  (1),  (2b), and (3),
where E is the expectation,  T is the length of planning horizon,  and (1  + r)~1 is the
discount  factor, with r being the discount rate reflecting  time preferences.  Assuming
that the decision maker learns over time, this problem can be alternatively formulated
as the following stochastic dynamic programming problem:
(4)  Vt(b t)  = Max  Et[7t + (1  + r)-lVt+(bt+l)]:
s.t.  equations (1), (2b), and (3)},
= Max {E t [ptst - ct(q,  bt, ktb,  st)
st
+ (1  +  r)V+[(l - ht)ktbt +  (1 - bt)bt -st]},
where  Vt(bt) is the indirect objective function (or value function) conditional on the size
of the breeding herd bt, and Et is the expectation  operator based  on the information
available  at time  t.  Learning  is represented  by  improvements  in  the  information
available to the decision maker from one period to the next. While the realized values
of the random variables  (Pt  , 6ht,  6bt  ke) become observed  at time t, some expectation
formation is needed to represent the expected future values of these random variables.
This issue is addressed in the next section.
Equasstion (4) is Bellman's equation of dynamic programming defining recursively the
value function Vt(bt). Under differentiability and assuming interior solutions,2 the first-
order necessary  condition for s, in (4) is:
(5)  Pt - ac,/tst  - (1  + r)-1Et[OVt+1/bt+ 1]  = 0.
From the envelope theorem applied to (4), we have:
(6)  aVt/ab,  = Et  [ -ac/ab  - ktct/aht
+ (1 + r)  -1(aVt+/Obt+ 1)((l - ht)kt  + (1  - 8bt))],
=  -ac/labb  - k ac/laht
+ [Et(pt) - ct/lst][(l  -6ht)kt  + (1  -bt)]'
1The assumption of risk neutrality has been commonly made in previous work on dynamic animal economics (e.g., Rosen;
Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman). Note that it neglects the possible role of risk aversion in dynamic resource allocation.
Exploring such issues appears to be a good topic for further research.
2 Although corner solutions may exist at the micro level, they typically are not observed at the aggregate level. Since our
empirical analysis relies on market data, our assumption of "interior solutions" then appears "reasonable." Note that this is
consistent with the analysis presented by Rosen and by Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman.
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using equation (5). Substituting (6) into equation (5) then yields:
(7)  (pt - actlast) - (1  + r)-Et -act+l/bt+l - kt+lact+ll/ht+ 1
+ (Pt+l - aCt+l/Ost+l)
x  ((1 - ah,t+l)kt+l +  (1  -b,t+))]  0.
Equation  (7)  is Euler's  equation,  showing  the dynamics of the  animal population
under optimal  management  and competitive  market  conditions.  It  gives  a  dynamic
relationship  between the current price Pt and the expected  next-period market price
Et(pt+l). Note that equation  (7)  involves the discounted expected  next-period  market
value,
(1 + r)  -Et[(pt+l  - Act+ 1/dst+)((1  - h,t+l)kt+l +  (1  - ,t+l))],
which is an increasing function of market price Pt+,  and productivity kt+ 1, and a decreas-
ing function of marginal slaughter cost act+1 /as,+i  and death rates 6h,,+1 and 6b,t+.  Equation
(7) can be alternatively written as:
,t =actlast  +  (1  +  r)- Et[(pt+ -acCt+1/ast+)((1  - 6ht+1)kt++  (1  -6b,t+))
-Ct+l/labt+l- kt+laCt+llaht+ 1].
This alternative form states that, at the optimum, the current market pricept equals the
marginal slaughter cost ac,/3st, plus the discounted expected next-period market value,
(1  +  r)- Et[(pt+l-  at+1/st+l)((1  - Ah,t+1)kt+l +  (1-  b,t+l))],
minus the discounted expected next-period marginal cost,
(1 +  r)-lEt[act+l/Obt+ +  kt+lct+l/aht+l].
This characterizes the optimal firm supply conditions taking market prices as given, and
shows that production  decisions are based in part on expectations about future tech-
nology and market prices.
Market Equilibrium
and Expectations Formation
In this section, we consider the competitive market equilibrium in an industry composed
of the firms managing the animal population. Assuming that the animal product is not
storable, the market equilibrium price is determined by the intersection of aggregate
supply and aggregate  demand.  We investigate how expectations  of future prices  are
formed.  Three  possible  expectation  regimes  are  considered:  rational  expectations
(regime 1), quasi-rational expectations (regime 2), and naive expectations (regime 3). We
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assume that all firms in the industry face the same technology,3 except for idiosyncratic
shocks in the death rates (6) and birth rates (k) that are firm specific. As a result, at the
firm level, we assume that the random variables 6 and k are independently distributed
of market prices.
At the market  level,  we  focus our attention  on aggregate  behavior.  Let B t be the
aggregate breeding herd, and St aggregate  slaughter. Then equation  (2)  suggests the
following specification:
(8)  B t = (1  - Ah,t-  )KtBt  + (1  - Ab,t-l)Bt_  - St,
where  Aht is the aggregate death rate for offspring,  Abt is the aggregate death rate for
adults, and Kt = HtIBt is aggregate  productivity (i.e., average  number of offspring per
adult) at time t. Equation (8) gives the dynamics of the aggregate breeding herd.
Rational Expectations
Under rational expectations  (regime 1), price expectations are consistent with market
equilibrium conditions. If each firm in the industry holds rational expectations and uses
a similar technology, then under a quadratic cost function c(-), Euler equation (7) applies
at the aggregate. Denote the price-dependent  demand function by:
(9)  = (9)  Pt  = f(Dt),
where  DA is the  aggregate demand  for slaughter,  and af/aDt < 0,  corresponding to a
downward-sloping  demand  curve.  Let  St denote  the  aggregate  number  of  animals
slaughtered at time t. Then, in the absence of storage, the market equilibrium condition
at time t is Dt = St, or:
(10)  Pt  = f(St).
The market equilibrium is then obtained by jointly solving equations (7) (applied at
the aggregate),  (8),  and (10)  for slaughter,  breeding  herd, and market  price.  Under
rational expectations, the expectation operator Et in (7) is defined to be consistent with
the market equilibrium model. This means that price expectations are consistent with
the reduced form  of the market  equilibrium model,  i.e., that future prices in (7)  can
be interpreted  as the dependent  variables  generated by this reduced  form. Assume
that the econometrician  does not have  more information than the industry decision
makers.  Denote by Eto the expectation operator based on the information available to
the econometrician at time t. Then equation (7) can be written as the following implicit
equation:
3 Assuming that all firms face the same technology may appear to be a restrictive assumption.  But the investigation of
dynamics under heterogeneous technology requires panel data. Basically, without panel data, the effects of heterogeneous
technology on market dynamics are not empirically tractable.  Unfortunately,  panel data on firms over several decades  are
rarely  available.  In this context, our  assumption  of homogeneous  technology  is motivated in large  part by current data
limitations.  While this does limit the depth of our analysis,  we leave the investigation of heterogeneous technology and its
effects on market dynamics as a good topic for further research.
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(11)  (Pt - actlast) - (1  +  [  - (1  +  r)  -aCtbt+l  - Et(kt+l)9ct+l/9ht+ 1
+ (Pt+l - act+l/ast+l)
x Et((1 - h,t+l)ktl + (1  -b,t+l))]=  ept
where ept is an error term satisfying EotEt(ept) =  0.
The structural market equilibrium model consists of the breeding equation (8), the
demand equation under market clearing (10), and the pricing equation (11) (applied at
the aggregate).  Given appropriate parametric  specifications  for the cost function c(t)
and for expectations with respect to k,+  and the  ,+ 1's, an econometric model is obtained
(see below).  The associated structural parameters  can be consistently estimated.  The
presence  of dependent  variables  on the right-hand  side  of the  ane  of  structural  equations
suggests using an instrumental variable method to deal with simultaneous  equation
bias. Below, we propose the use of Hansen's generalized method of moments (GMM) as
an instrumental variable method (see Hansen; Hansen and Singleton). In principle, the
instruments should be chosen from the information  set common to the econometrician
and industry  decision  makers.  Such  instruments  would  be  orthogonal  to the  error
terms, and thus provide consistent parameter estimates. It is known that the choice of
instruments is an important issue with GMM, as parameter estimates can be sensitive
to competing sets of instruments. This suggests a need to assess the relevance of instru-
ments used in GMM estimation (see below).
Quasi-Rational  Expectations
Under quasi-rational expectations (regime 2), prices are anticipated on the basis of their
time-series  properties  as  estimated  from  historical  data  (Nerlove,  Grether,  and
Carvalho). We assume that expected prices in (7) under quasi-rational expectations are
obtained  from the prediction of the univariate  autoregressive  process  for the corres-
ponding prices. Letyt follow the autoregressive process  {y,  =  tPo-  +  PyO  t + Zjl  ±yjYtj  + e
where the P's are parameters and E,(e 5y) = 0. Then,
(12)  E,(yt+ 1)  = PyO  + yO(t  + 1)  + E  Pyjyt+ 1
j>1
where y, is either pt or qt. Equation (12) gives expected prices that are consistent with
the observed dynamic pattern of prices. When substituted into (7), these expected prices
depict the dynamic pricing equations under quasi-rational expectations. Then, equations
(7)  [applied at the aggregate,  and using (12)],  (8),  and (10) give the market dynamics
under quasi-rational expectations. As in the rational expectations case, this system can
be estimated econometrically  after appropriate parameterization.
Naive Expectations
Next, we consider the case of naive expectations  (regime 3). Under naive expectations,
producers are assumed to expect the last observed price. This simple expectation rule
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is the standard assumption in the cobweb model (Ezekiel). With respect to the variable
yt, it implies:
(13)  Et(ytj) = yt,  forj > 1.
Note that (13) ignores the dynamic properties  of market prices if they depart from  a
random-walk  model. When substituted into (7),  these expected  prices determine the
dynamic  pricing conditions under naive expectations.  Then, equations (7)  [applied at
the aggregate,  and using (13)],  (8),  and (10)  give the market  dynamics  under naive
expectations.  Again, this system can be  estimated econometrically  after appropriate
parameterization.
Heterogeneous Expectations
Finally, we consider the possibility of heterogeneity across firms in obtaining and pro-
cessing market information. As mentioned, this heterogeneity can be due to differences
among firms in access to information or in the cost or ability to process information (e.g.,
because of differences in the decision  maker's education  or experience).  As a result,
heterogeneous  expectations  can arise within the industry.
We consider the possible presence of  three expectation regimes. Denote by N  =  {1,  2, 3}
the set of expectation regimes within the industry, with i EN being the ith group charac-
terized by a given expectation formation.  We allow for some firms to exhibit rational
expectations (regime 1), others quasi-rational  expectations  (regime 2), and still others
naive expectations  (regime 3).  Let Eit be the expectation operator reflecting the infor-
mation available to the ith group of firms at time t, i eN.
At time t,  denote  by bit the size of the breeding herd in the ith group,  by hi  the
number of offspring, and by sit the number of animals slaughtered in the ith  group, i eN.
Let the cost function for the ith group at time t be  it =  ct(qt bit, hit  si), i eN. Then, from
(7), the pricing equation for the ith group is:
(14)  (pt - acitlasit) - (1 + r)-1Eit[  -acit+l/bit+1 - ki,t+li,t+ 1/ahi,t+ 1
+ (Pt+1 - aci,t+l/ai,t+ 
)
X ((1-  hit+l)k
i,
t +l+  (1  -bi,t+l))] = 0,
where  (6 ^it,  6bit) denote the ith group death rates, and kit is the ith group productivity,
i eN. Equation  (14)  involves  the  expectation  operator Ei  reflecting  the  information
available  to the ith group at time  t. For each expectation  regime i in (14),  the speci-
fication corresponds to the model discussed above representing the dynamics of prices
under the corresponding regime. For example, equation (12) applies in (14) under quasi-
rational expectations (i = 2), while equation (13) holds under naive expectations (i = 3).
This illustrates the role of information in-dynamic resource allocation. By showing that
price  expectations  can  influence  pricing,  the  model  implies  that  observed  market
dynamics depend on the nature of price expectations  from all market participants. In
that sense, the observed dynamics of prices can provide an empirical basis to estimate
and evaluate the information processed by market participants.
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The empirical implementation of the above equations requires addressing the issue
of the relevant information set involved in the formation of expectations. Unfortunately,
data are rarely available on group-specific  information (i.e.,  bit, sit, hit, etc., i eN). As a
result, equation (14) is typically not empirically tractable for each group i EN. Here, we
consider the case where data are available  only at the aggregate level (i.e., aggregate
breeding herd, B t = liEN bit; aggregate  slaughter,  St =  EiEN Sit; aggregate number of off-
spring, Ht =  EiEN hit; etc.).  We are interested in developing  a methodology that can be
empirically tractable in this context.
Such  a  model  should  have  the  following  desirable  characteristics.  It  should  be
consistent with the Euler equation (14)  for each group within the industry.  It  should
also include as a special case the situation of homogeneous expectations just discussed.
For example, if all firms use a single expectation regime (say thejth regime), then the
model  should reduce to the Euler equation (14) for the jth group.  On that basis, we
propose  to represent  optimal  slaughter  as  a weighted  sum  of equation  (14)  across
groups:
(15)  E  it {(Pt - acit/asit) - (1  + r)lEit[  -Oci,t+l/abi,t+  - ki,t+laci,t+ 1/hi,t+ 1 ieN
+ (Pt+ - aCit+l/si,t+l)
X ((1-  ahii,+l)it+l  + (1-  bi,t+l))]}  0
where wi  denotes (nonstochastic) weights for the ith group at time t, with wit > 0, i eN,
and  ieNNWit = 1. We interpret the weights  (wit) as "market shares," where wt = sit/S t.
Equation  (15)  has the desirable  characteristics just mentioned.  It  is implied  by the
group-specific Euler equations given in (14). If all firms use a single expectation regime
(say thejth regime),  then wjt = 1,  and wit = 0,  for all i #j, implying that equation (15)
reduces to the Euler equation (14) for the jth group. In other words, the general case of
heterogeneous expectations given in (15) nests nicely the special case of homogeneous
expectations.
The specification for each group i in (15) is given by the specification of the corres-
ponding expectation regime discussed  above. For simplicity, we will assume that the
cost function c(.) is linear in (b, h, s) so that the marginal costs in (15) can be evaluated
independently of the group-level quantities. Note that this is the assumption also made
by Rosen, and by Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman. Assuming that the weights wit can
be parameterized, equation (15) provides a convenient econometric  specification that
introduces  heterogeneous  expectations  in  a  manner  consistent  with  within-group
rationality (see below).
In order to make  equation (15)  econometrically  tractable,  the weights  w  must be
identified. This requires that the three expectation regimes involve different information
sets.  The  distinction  between  naive  expectations  and  quasi-rational  expectations
requires that market prices do not follow a random walk. But is the distinction between
quasi-rational and rational expectations always meaningful? There are situations where
the two  can be equivalent.  For example,  this could occur if all firms exhibit rational
expectations, while quasi-rational expectations are generated by the reduced form of the
rational  expectations  model.  However,  whenever  some  market participants  do  not
exhibit "full rationality," their effect on price dynamics typically will influence quasi-
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rational expectations in a way that can differ from "Muth-rationality"  (e.g., Brock and
Hommes).  To the extent that this happens, the distinction among expectation regimes
becomes empirically meaningful.
Thus, the structural market equilibrium  model under heterogeneous  expectations
consists of the aggregate breeding equation (8), the aggregate demand equation under
market clearing (10), and the price equation (15). As in the case of rational expectations
discussed above, the structural parameters can be consistently estimated (provided that
they are identified) using an instrumental variable method. Again, we rely on Hansen's
GMM estimation method to estimate the parameters. This is illustrated next with an
application to the pork market.
Application to the U.S. Pork Market
The pork  breeding herd  consists of adult females  (sows)  and males  (boars).  After  a
pregnancy period of 114  days,  sows produce  pigs at a rate of 8-12  pigs per sow per
farrowing.  The pigs are nursed  for 3-5 weeks, then weaned.  This allows each sow to
produce  about  two  farrowings  a  year.  Pigs  can  be  fed  until 6-7  months  old,  and
marketed at a weight of 180-250 pounds. Or they can join the breeding herd, with a first
mating around eight months of age. Adult pigs become fully grown at 1.5-2 years of age,
and can live up to 9-15 years.
Aggregate data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) on
the U.S. pork market between 1960 and 1996. The data include the size of the breeding
herd (Bt), pig crop (Ht), slaughter (St), hog price received by farmers in the U.S. (Pt), as
well as corn price received by farmers (qt), as published annually in Agricultural  Statis-
tics (USDA). Corn price represents input cost, as corn is the most important production
input. All prices (Pt, qt) are measured as real prices, deflated by the consumer price index
(as reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics). The analysis
relies on annual data.4 In this context, the U.S. pork market matches well the model
developed in our  earlier sections.  First, the assumption made that offspring become
adults after one year is nearly met. Second, meat production is the only final output
obtained from pork (at slaughter).
Based on the model developed in previous sections, we propose the following model
specification.  We specify the aggregate  demand function (10) in linear form:
(16)  Pt = do + d1St + d2t  +  edt,
where  (do, d1, d2) are demand parameters, and ed  is an error term with mean zero and
finite variance.  Also, let the aggregate  death rates be Aht =  a0 + alt +  eaht for offspring,
and Abt  =  a0 + alt + ebt for adults, where  (ao,  a1)  are  parameters,  and eaht  and eabt are
4 Using quarterly data in our analysis  also was considered.  We proceeded with annual data for  two reasons. First, it
simplified the analysis. Second, this avoids the issue of the changing seasonality of pork production during the sample period.
The handling of nonstationary  seasonality creates  significant challenges to the examination of dynamic market analysis.
Addressing such challenges appears to be a good topic for further research.
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random variables with mean zero.5 This represents the death rates as being stochastic
with a linear trend t. If the slope coefficient is negative (a, < 0), the effect of the linear
trend would represent improved management  contributing to lower death rates over
time.
Now, the dynamics of the aggregate breeding herd given in (8) can be written as:
(17a)  B t =(1  - a  - a(t -1))(1  +KKt  )Bt  -St,  + e,
where
(17b)  Kt  = HtlBt  = y0
+ y1t + ekt,
such that yo and y1 are parameters,  and {ebt = (-KtlBt-leah,tl - Btleabtl)}and  ekt are
error terms  distributed  with mean  zero  and finite  variance.  Equation  (17b)  shows
the productivity factor Kt as stochastic with a linear trend t.  If it has a positive effect
(y1 > 0), the linear trend would reflect technological progress in the U.S. pork industry,
contributing to improved productivity over time.
We assume that the random variables kit (the birth rate), 6hit, and 6bit (the death rates)
are independently distributed, serially uncorrelated, and satisfy EotEit(ki,t+ )  = Eot(Kt  1),
EotEit(6hi,t+l)  = Et  (Ah,t+1),  and EotEit(6bi,t+l) =  Eot(Ab,t+l), for all t and all i eN, where Eot
is the expectation based on the information available to the econometrician at time t.
This can be interpreted to mean that, in the absence of disaggregate data, the best the
investigator  can  do is to estimate  individual  productivity index  and  death rates  by
their corresponding aggregate measure.  From equations (17a) and (17b), this implies
that EotEit(ki,t+)  = Eot(Kt+ 1) = Yo + y1(t +  1), and EotEit( 6hi,t+l) =  EotEit(bi,t+l)  = Et(At+l) =
a o +  a1(t  + 1). These relationships are substituted in the dynamic pricing equations when
the model  is estimated econometrically.  Also,  let the cost function ct(qt, bt, ktbt, st) be
specified  as  ct(') =  c0o(qt, t) + (co +  c1qt +  c2t )b, where the c's are parameters  to be esti-
mated. This specification ignores slaughter cost; such costs are relatively small and are
neglected in our analysis.
Before estimating our structural model under different expectation regimes, we inves-
tigated the dynamic properties of market prices. Autoregressive models of pork price (Pt)
and corn price (qt) were specified and estimated. The resulting estimates are used below
to represent quasi-rational expectations  [as given in equation (12)].
The following pork price equation was estimated (with standard errors in parentheses
below the parameter estimates):
(18)  Pt = 6.9515  - 0.0996t  + 0.6318ptI  - 0.1524pt_2 + 0.2927pt_3
(3.9669)  (0.0571)  (0.1588)  (0.1876)  (0.1613)
R 2 = 0.7032.
Several diagnostic tests were performed. The Godfrey test for serial correlation of the
residual indicated no statistical evidence of serial correlation (with ap-value of 0.5527).
5 This specification  assumes that the average  aggregate death rate is the same for offspring and adults. This assumption
appears restrictive. It was made after attempts to estimate the two death rates separately failed to give reliable and credible
results.
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The Ramsey RESET test of functional form failed to uncover evidence of inappropriate
functional  form  (with  a  p-value  of  0.6405).  The  Lagrange  multiplier  test  of the
regression of the squared residuals on the squared predicted values gave no statistical
evidence  of heteroskedasticity  (with a p-value  of 0.2020).  Finally,  a  Chow  test for
parameter stability had ap-value of 0.0728. Using a 5% significance level, this suggests
no strong statistical evidence  of structural change during the estimation period.
The negative coefficient on the time trend t in (18) reflects a decrease in the real price
of pork during the sample period. The roots of the estimated difference  equation (18)
were evaluated. There are one real root and two complex roots. The  dominant root is
real:  0.8544.  The  complex roots  have a  modulus of 0.5853  and  are associated  with
cyclical patterns. This is consistent with previous literature establishing the existence
of a pork cycle  (e.g., Talpaz;  Kaylen; Hayes and Schmitz; Chavas and Holt).  Equation
(18) suggests that naive price expectations would fail to capture some important aspects
of pork market dynamics.
The following corn price equation was estimated (with standard errors in parentheses
below the parameter estimates):
(19)  qt  = 0.6111  - 0.0077t  + 0.9842qt_1 - 0.3480qt_2
(0.2230)  (0.0036)  (0.1637)  (0.1629)
R 2 = 0.7792.
Used as a diagnostic test, the Godfrey test for serial correlation of the residual showed
no  statistical evidence  of serial  correlation  (with a p-value of 0.3812).  The Ramsey
RESET test of functional form did not find evidence of inappropriate functional  form
(with ap-value of 0.6405). The Lagrange multiplier test of the regression of the squared
residuals on the squared predicted values gave no strong evidence of heteroskedasticity
(with ap-value of 0.3058). Finally, a Chow test of parameter stability had ap-value of
0.1472, indicating no statistical evidence of structural change.
The negative coefficient on the time trend t in (19) reflects a decrease in the real price
of corn during the sample period. The roots of the estimated difference  equation (19)
were evaluated. There are two complex roots, with a modulus of 0.5899. Again, equation
(19) suggests that naive price expectations would fail to capture some important aspects
of corn market dynamics.
We then estimated the structural models discussed in the previous section. First, we
consider three models representing the scenarios discussed earlier: (a) rational expec-
tations;  (b)  quasi-rational  expectations  [as given by (12),  using the estimates  of the
autoregressive  processes  (18) and (19)];  and (c)  naive expectations  [as given by (13)].
This latter scenario is the standard assumption made in the cobweb  model (Ezekiel).
The parameters of these three models were estimated for the U.S. pork market based
on annual data for 1960-96, using the generalized method of moments (GMM) proposed
by Hansen. The  analysis  assumes that the discount rate r is set equal to 0.05.6 The
chosen  instruments  were  the  one-period  lagged  variables  for  breeding  herd  Bt_1,
slaughter St_  , productivity Kt 1, pork price Pt-1, corn price qt 1, and a time trend t. The
variance-covariance matrix of the parameters was robustly estimated using the Newey-
6 The results presented below were found to be fairly insensitive to the choice of the discount rate r.
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West estimator, correcting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with one period
lag.  Under a set of regularity  conditions,  the resulting parameter  estimates  can be
shown to be consistent and asymptotically  normal (Hansen).
For regime 1 (rational expectations)  and regime 3 (naive expectations),  the model is
estimated in one step. However,  for regime 2 (quasi-rational expectations), it proceeds
in two  steps.  The first step involves  estimating the autoregressive  processes  for hog
price and corn price [i.e., equations (18) and (19)].  In a second step, such estimates are
used  to generate  expected  prices  according  to (12),  which  are  substituted  into  the
dynamic pricing equation.  The structural model is then estimated by GMM, yielding
consistent parameter estimates. In this case, the calculation  of the standard errors is
adjusted to correct for the fact that the estimated expected prices were obtained from
a stochastic equation. The estimation results are presented in table 1.
The validity of the econometric specification was first assessed using the Hansen test
on the overidentification restrictions generated by the instruments. For each expectation
model,  the Hansen test  does not give statistical  evidence  against the orthogonality
restrictions between the overidentifying instruments and the error terms (see table 1).
This suggests that the model specification  and the choice  of the instruments  appear
appropriate.
All the estimated coefficients reported in table 1 have the expected sign, and most are
significantly  different  from  zero.  Given t =  1 in  1945,  the parameters  aO  and a, in
equation (17a) show that the average annual death rate has significantly declined from
about 8% in the 1960s to about 3%  in the  1990s.  This reflects improved management
practices.  The parameters  Yo  and y,  in equation  (17b) indicate that productivity has
increased significantly over time-the average number of offspring per adult per year
has gone from 6-7 in the 1960s to 13-14 in the 1990s. The parameters do, dl, and d2 in
the demand  equation (16)  show  a downward-sloping  demand function (d1 <  0). The
associated demand elasticity evaluated at sample means is about -0.34. This indicates
an inelastic demand for pork. This inelastic demand is broadly consistent with previous
empirical pork demand estimates.
The parameter estimates for the a's, y's, and d's are fairly similar across expectation
regimes (see table 1). As expected, the cost parameters co, c1, and c2 show that corn price
(through its positive effect on feed cost) tends to increase the marginal cost of holding
animals.  However, the estimates of c1 vary substantially across regimes-from 220 in
regime 1, to 157 in regime 2, and 140 in regime 3. This suggests that each expectation
regime has different implications for dynamic pricing.
Next, we consider the case of heterogeneous expectations, allowing for the simultan-
eous presence of three expectation regimes: rational expectations (i = 1), quasi-rational
expectations  (i = 2), and naive expectations  (i = 3). This is represented by the pricing
equation (15), and is simply a weighted sum of the specifications discussed above under
the three expectation regimes. As noted earlier, we interpret the weights wit as "market
shares" for the ith group.  Also,  we  assume that wit = wi, i.e., that the proportion  of
decision  makers  in each  expectation  regime  is constant  over time.  This  convenient
assumption  can  appear  somewhat restrictive;  it is imposed  mostly to  improve  the
empirical tractability of the model. We thus treat the wi's in (15) as parameters to be
estimated. Such estimation  provides a basis for investigating empirically the hetero-
geneity of expectations among market participants in the pork industry.
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Table  1.  Parameter Estimates Under Each Expectation Regime
Rational  Quasi-Rational  Naive
Expectation  Expectation  Expectation
Parameter  (i = 1)  (i = 2)  (i = 3)
aO  0.0949*  0.0967*  0.1019*
(0.0087)  (0.0107)  (0.0098)
a,  -0.0012*  -0.0012*  -0.0013*
(0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)
Yo  6.3590*  6.3218*  6.3152*
(0.0895)  (0.0869)  (0.0866)
Y1  0.1494*  0.1507*  0.1504*
(0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.0034)
do  70.3966*  69.1173*  66.8208*
(2.2530)  (1.9942)  (2.0451)
d,  -0.5675*  -0.5517*  -0.5270*
(0.0316)  (0.0290)  (0.0298)
[-0.3574]  [-0.3474]a  [-0.3319]a
d2  -0.1452  -0.1499*  -0.1434
(0.0308)  (0.0312)  (0.0317)
Co  -166.4554*  -58.3242  -35.6396
(40.7611)  (40.4799)  (21.6010)
cl  220.8117*  157.6548*  140.9334*
(21.4491)  (23.1108)  (9.6919)
c2  3.7553*  2.3648*  2.1367*
(0.6457)  (0.5850)  (0.3669)
Minimum Distance  16.9231  16.7690  16.6207
Hansen Test  X2  (18)  X 2 (18)  X 2 (18)
p-Value  0.5284  0.5390  0.5493
Standard Error of the Error Terms:
Equation (16)  2.6549  2.6549  2.6197
Equation (17a)  0.0313  0.0313  0.0310
Equation (17b)  0.6204  0.6204  0.6120
Pricing Equation  35.3156  30.2028  31.3400
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes that the corresponding  parameter is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
aNumbers in brackets  are demand elasticities evaluated at mean values.
Again, the parameters of the heterogeneous expectation model were estimated using
the Hansen  GMM method. And again, the analysis  assumes that the discount rate is
r  =  0.05. The chosen instruments  were the same as above.  The  variance-covariance
matrix was robustly estimated using the Newey-West estimator correcting for hetero-
skedasticity  and serial  correlation  with a  one-period lag. As in the case of regime  2
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Minimum Distance  15.9312
Hansen Test  X 2 (16)
p-Value  0.4578
Standard Error of the Error Terms:
Equation (16)  2.6549
Equation (17a)  0.0313
Equation (17b)  0.6204
Pricing Equation  26.6059
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes that the corresponding parameter is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
discussed above, the estimation incorporates  two  steps.  The first step involves  esti-
mating autoregressive processes for hog price and corn price [equations (18) and (19)].
Under the quasi-rational expectation regime (i = 2), this is used to generate expected
prices according to (12), which are then substituted into the dynamic pricing equation.
The  structural  model  is  then  estimated  by  GMM,  yielding  consistent  parameter
estimates. The calculation of the standard errors is adjusted to correct for the fact that
the  quasi-rational  expected  prices  were  obtained  from  a  stochastic  equation.  The
resulting estimates are presented in table 2.
The validity of the econometric specification was assessed using the Hansen test of
overidentifying  restrictions  in  GMM  estimation.  The  Hansen  test  does  not  give
statistical evidence against the orthogonality restrictions between the overidentifying
instruments and the error terms (see table 2). This suggests that the model specification
and the choice of the instruments appear appropriate.
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All the estimated coefficients reported in table 2 have the expected sign, and most are
significantly  different  from  zero.  The parameters  a,  y,  and d  are  similar  to those
reported  in table  1.  Again,  the cost parameters  (c)  suggest that feed  cost tends  to
increase  the marginal  cost of holding  animals.  Finally,  the estimated market  share
parameters  (w) provide useful information  on the heterogeneity  of expectations.  They
show  that the  percentages  of farmers  exhibiting  rational  expectations  (w1),  quasi-
rational expectations (w2), and naive expectations (w3) are, respectively,  19.5%, 73.3%,
and 7.2%. Note the standard error of w3is somewhat large, indicating that the estimate
of  w3 is  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  However,  the  proportion  of  market
participants exhibiting quasi-rational expectations (w2 = 0.733) is significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. And the proportion of market participants exhibiting either
rational expectation  (w1 =  0.195)  or  naive  expectation  (w3 =  0.072)  is  significantly
different from one.
These results provide statistical evidence of heterogeneous  expectations in the U.S.
pork market. They suggest that not all market participants have similar expectation
formation. The findings also indicate that a minority of pork farmers either may behave
naively (w3 = 0.072) or are fully Muth-rational  (w1 = 0.195). The econometric  evidence
shows that the largest proportion of pork production is associated with quasi-rational
expectation (w2 = 0.733). This suggests that the majority of U.S. pork producers (73.3%)
understand how pork prices have evolved historically,  but their decisions do not fully
take into account the dynamics of supply/demand  conditions in the pork market.
Implications and Conclusions
We  have  examined  the  nature  of price  expectations  in  a  competitive  market.  The
approach  applied  to the U.S.  pork  market  indicates the  presence  of heterogeneous
expectations  among  pork  producers.  Our  findings  show  that  19.5%  of  the  pork
market  is  characterized  by forward-looking  price  expectations  formed  according  to
Muth's rational expectations hypothesis. Also,  a small proportion of pork production
(7.2%)  involves  "naive  expectations,"  where  production  decisions  depend  only  on
the  most  recently  observed  market  prices  (as  assumed  in  the  cobweb  model;  see
Ezekiel). Finally, a majority of pork production (73.3%) comes from farmers using quasi-
rational expectations and anticipating future prices on the basis of observed historical
patterns.
These results can be interpreted in terms of the costs and benefits to market parti-
cipants of obtaining and processing information  about market prices. Indeed, while we
did not measure such costs and benefits directly, our findings shed some indirect light
on their relative magnitude.
Consider that market participants would  decide to obtain price information only if
they perceive  receiving  positive  net benefit from  it.  The  finding that 73.3%  of pork
production is carried out by farmers exhibiting quasi-rational expectations suggests that
most  producers  perceive  positive  net benefit  anticipating  future  prices  from their
observed  past behavior.  This can be interpreted to mean that the gross benefit from
understanding the time-series  properties  of historical prices  is larger  than the cost
of obtaining the associated information. But for these producers,  why are "backward-
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looking" quasi-rational expectations preferred to the "forward-looking" rational expec-
tations? By not being "Muth-rational," quasi-rational expectations are neglecting some
relevant  information  about market  price  determination  (e.g.,  the  characteristics  of
supply and demand conditions).  This means that the gross benefit of rational expec-
tations is expected to be larger than the gross benefit of quasi-rational expectations  for
a particular producer. It follows that, compared to rational expectations, the net benefit
of quasi-rational  expectations can be higher only if the associated information cost is
lower.  Our results suggest that, for farmers engaged in 73.3%  of pork production, the
net benefit of quasi-rational expectations is larger than that for rational expectations.
This can be interpreted as indirect evidence that the cost of having rational expectations
is significantly higher than the cost of having quasi-rational expectations.  This differ-
ence in information cost appears to have an important influence on resource allocation.
More  specifically,  for the farmers  using quasi-rational expectations,  the high cost of
obtaining and processing rational expectations apparently leads them to choose use of
less than full information, thus generating "boundedly rational" behavior.
This finding has several implications. First, our analysis presents indirect evidence
that the cost of obtaining and processing market information is positive and significant.
Second, this cost can provide incentives for decision makers to save on information cost
by exhibiting bounded rationality, which influences prices and the dynamics of markets.
At this point, more research is needed to study the linkages across bounded rationality,
expectation  formation,  and  the nature  of market  cycles.  Third,  we  found  empirical
evidence of heterogeneity in expectations in the U.S. pork market. This means that the
ability to obtain  and process  information varies significantly among market  partici-
pants. Further research is needed to investigate this heterogeneity and its effects  on
market dynamics.  Finally, the relative importance  of backward-looking  expectations
indicates the possibility of significant dynamic allocative inefficiency in the pork market.
Is it possible to improve human capital so as to reduce information cost and increase the
quality of expectation formation? Given our finding that only 19.5% of the pork market
is associated with "Muth-rationality," there appear to be good prospects to improve the
"market intelligence"  of industry decision makers, leading to better use of information
and improved dynamic allocative efficiency.  More research is needed on this topic.
In concluding, it is worthwhile  to point out some limitations  of our  analysis. For
example,  we  assumed that all decision  makers  are risk neutral.  Although  such  an
assumption  has been commonly made  in recent  research  on market  dynamics  (e.g.,
Rosen; Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman), it neglects the possible role of risk aversion.
Investigating  the effect of risk aversion  on price  dynamics is a good topic for future
research. Also, the issue of structural change is potentially important (e.g., Shonkwiler
and Spreen). Besides technical progress, this can involve recent changes in the structure
of pork production  as well as  changes  in  the "market intelligence"  of pork  market
participants. As suggested by Brock and Hommes, it could be that the nature of price
expectations changes in different phases of the pork cycle. Further research is needed
to investigate  such issues.
[Received November 1997;final  revision received October 1998.]
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